A Strategy for Failure?

“You may not be interested in strategy, but strategy is interested in you.” Leon Trotsky

While we do not want to cause any division in the anarchist movement in the USA, honesty in evaluating direct action is important when anarchists in the United States seem like we might have a chance at actually winning by redefining the dominant discourse in the United States. It is in this spirit that we produce the following critique of the astoundingly conventional “three-tier strategy” put forward by Unconventional Action in hope that at best this late stage in the build up to the Republican National Convention a viable action alternative strategy can be created or anarchists can at least be aware of the high potential for failure of the “three-tier strategy” and plan accordingly.

The first thing to notice about the “Three-Tier Strategy” is that it is a plan based on blockades. All three tiers are blockades based on stopping delegates, with each tier simply being a different kind of target. Essentially, the “three tiers” are one and the same thing. You don’t need a Webster’s Dictionary to realize that all three are described by synonyms - “blockade; immobilize; block.”. The inspiration for Unconventional Action seems to be a heartfelt but desperate hope to repeat the success of Seattle for the RNC 2008. This fetish for blockades ignores the reality that the Seattle blockades were successful because the police were not prepared and there was a large amount of people in the Northwest, primarily Earth First! veterans, who were well-trained and had a large tradition of blockading. Despite exclamations that “we already have blockading skills” by the RNC Welcoming Committee, the reality of this is doubtful at best. The anarcho-liberals from California will no doubt come, but they are a minuscule force at best, incapable of shutting anything down outside of San Francisco, as proven by the disastrous day of action at the 2004 RNC. Furthermore, they will not likely come in large numbers due to the lack of a non-violence code. When is the last time large-scale blockades have been successful in the USA? Are there going to be large, mass-scale participation by liberals, with skilled blockading trainers? None of these factors seem to hold in St. Paul.

Victory will only be gained by numbers or surprise, and surprise has been lost. Unconventional Action claims that RNC 2008 hosts “strategic vulnerabilities unique to any trade summit or party convention of recent years.” Although the river does present obvious blockading points, these strategic vulnerabilities have at this point been announced to the police. In RNC 2008, the police would be foolish not to be very well prepared for any blockades, especially as Unconventional Action has announced the strategy long in advance. The police should be ready and waiting at the obvious intersections to pounce on protesters. The success of the blockades at Seattle were entirely due to surprise, which has been lost over a decade. Previous attempts to repeat Seattle have almost all ended in failure. Blockades at the A16 protests against the IMF in Washington DC in 2001 had mixed results, and the protests at the FTAA in Quebec in 2001 where the blockades failed but the move towards massive street fighting was viewed as a success.

One could object that we are misinterpreting the blockades as merely nonviolent civil disobedience. While there were no huge burning barricades, some of the blockades at the RNC 2000 were far from non-violent, and yet were still swept off the streets by cops quickly and effectively with minimal to no disruption of the delegates. The same can be said of the decentralized blockading strategy based on a “diversity of tactics” put forward by the People’s Strike in Washington, D.C., which resulted in almost everyone being arrested before they even got to the streets. For some inane reason this decentralized blockading idea was foolishly repeated with a more fluffy flavor and even less results at the A31 at RNC 2004. Recent moderately successful blockades overseas at the G8 in Scotland in 2005 and Germany in 2007 relied on a huge rural terrain and a police force that was spread very thin, conditions unlike those in St. Paul. The best bet for blockades would be if there were few police and the blockades were spread around the city in an unpredictable manner, but this would require a level of self-organization of affinity groups and blockading skills that seems to be unlikely at best. The definition of insanity is to repeat something that has failed again and again, and expect different results.

If one does not have surprise, one can assume sheer numbers might lead to success. In the RNC 2008, who exactly is going to do these blockades proposed by Unconventional Action? Where are the numbers? The primary difference between this convention action and the Seattle WTO protests is that it finally seems that many Americans may actually sympathize with action against the Republicans. However, sympathy does not translate into numbers, as the decline of the anti-war marches happened at the same time popular discontent with the Iraq war was at its highest. If liberals are having a hard time marching, one wonders about their ability to do blockades. One can assume that maybe large amounts of liberals and pacifists will show up, although this is questionable at best given the distance from San Francisco to Minneapolis. Unlike the West Coast, the Midwest does not have a tradition of blockades. Minneapolis radicals do have a tradition of defending autonomous zones like the Minnehaha Free State in 1998 and even fighting through a police line at the International Society for Animal Genetics (ISAG) in 2000. Midwest anarchists recently with the I-69 campaign also are learning well the skills of fast-moving “hit and run” direct actions.

The “Three Tier” plan seems to be aimed at mostly Black Bloc anarchists, despite it not calling for a Black Bloc. Even assuming that most Black Bloc anarchists types decide to do the blockades, this is likely at most a thousand protesters (the largest Black Bloc being A16 2001 at the Inaugural 2004, or maybe two thousand if everyone from San Francisco comes), which might very well be surrounded with ease if divided into a dozen roving mini-Black Blocs. Perhaps a few small Black Blocs could be successful, but again, the key is numbers and surprise. We should remember that at RNC 2000 and 2004, about seven thousand or so non-Black Bloc people showed up for the blockades in total (including liberals, anarchists, and every stripe in between), and were easily wiped off the streets by a large, well-equipped, and moderately brutal police force. Maybe the liberal march will somehow merge with the blockades like the Steel Workers in Seattle, but betting money or time in jail on this seems foolish. The main positive difference is that the Minneapolis and St. Paul police forces are considerably smaller than those at earlier RNCs, but the Minneapolis Police are already well versed in tasers, and if their crackdown on the Critical Mass of the preRNC is any sign, they will not hesitate to just arrest people at the earliest opportunity. Also, cops may be bussed in from elsewhere. The only hope seems to that SDS will motivate thousands to show up and do civil disobedience, and that the police will be both unprepared and not increase their relatively small numbers. This is unlikely as the convention is during school, so SDS will not show in large numbers. The numbers game does not look good.

The general trajectory at the protests in the United States is generally some sort of untenable plan based on “repeating Seattle” via blockades thought up by either the local organizers or a series of consultas…or rammed down our throats by professional activists. Like in Miami FTAA 2003, after people start arriving at the protest they realize the plan put forward by the “organizers” is a bad idea. At the last minute there is a consensus meeting where the vast majority of people try to come up with an actual plan with some chance of working, but this is usually derailed by professional activist “facilitators” who attempt to preserve their untenable plan and – worse case, as in Miami - any deals they struck with the police. In frustration, anarchists usually attempt a Black Bloc, there are some last minute secret plans, and many people gravitate towards the “Official” plan. This results in a botched and ineffective protests, since there is neither time nor resources to put together a good alternative. While we appreciate the idealistic yet untenable plan is being put forward based on blockades by Unconventional Action, who we have the utmost of respect for, we feel like it would be a good time to step back and honestly look “outside the box” of the “Three-Tier” plan while there is still a little time left. The time is now to formulate a Plan B. A rather academic analysis of the Seattle WTO protest is not enough.

There is an Alternative

“Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.” Sun Tzu

The obvious alternative is to attempt to disrupt the convention via a frontal assault with large numbers: the infamous Black Bloc. Given their behavior at previous events, increasing numbers of everyone from the SDS to punks are interested in this alternative. At every recent protest from the Inaugural 2004 to the “Suicide March” at the G8 in Scotland to the 2007 October Rebellion in DC, a large Black Bloc has been surprisingly effective. Our courage seems to be directly proportional to the amount of other anarchists near us, and Black Blocs of over a few hundred are difficult for police to simply mass arrest, unlike smaller groups doing blockades. Ideally for the RNC, a Black Bloc of over a thousand could be formed, one with a tight tactical group of locals who can both help prepare defensive materials and have a great knowledge of the local streets. Black Blocs are best organized via closed affinity groups who meet before-hand and then announce a Bloc in public on the Net so people can come prepared, but keep the details of its precise meeting hidden with an eventual public announcement right before the protest. If a Black Bloc is exceptionally well-prepared, having the ability to move fast, break down into smaller groups and reform (as in the “Five-Fingers” tactic at the G8 in Germany, although this tactic is best used with very large numbers), as well as reform at agreed-upon reconvergence spots, can be a huge asset. At worse, the Black Bloc leads to an epic confrontation with the police and large arrests, which is arguably better than hosts of small confrontations of the police and large arrests that would go unnoticed. At best, the police can be overpowered. There is a call for an Anti-Capitalist Bloc by what apparently is the IWW (Industrial Workers of the World), but it appears to be more of a public relations strategy during the march, as they explicitly deny being a “black bloc” like in Seattle, strange given that it was the most effective Black Bloc in recent history, with the possible exception of the A16 Anti-IMF Black Bloc.

A second alternative would rely on surprise, not just the numbers of a Black Bloc. Closed blockading affinity groups that scout the locations and and decide on blockading places in secret have a chance of actually getting to their blockading locations. Unlike the vast majority of protesters, these groups could rely on whatever disruption is caused by the “public” blockades and a possible Black Bloc to put themselves into position, even as protesters are being swept off the streets by the cops. By preparing blockading material and being trained in advance, these groups could move swiftly and quickly reconfigure their blockades based on police presence. Again, such group or groups would have to form outside any open meetings, but this could be done and has been done with success in the past, ranging from the G8 in Scotland 2005 to the IMF protests in Prague in 2001. These networks of closed group do not have to limit themselves to “blockades” but going after whatever targets they believe will maximize the chances of victory. What locations and times would the police never suspect? These are the places and times for closed groups to strike.

A last alternative would be some yet unarticulated plan based on both numbers and surprise, a Plan B. This could involve striking at a different time and place, going after some target besides the obvious moving of the delegates, an action meant to maximize morale and puncture the media spectacle of the ritualized mass protest that no-one, even most anarchists, seem to believe in anymore. This was the spirit of the Seattle Black Bloc, and while repeating its form like dressing in black may be foolish, the actual content may be possible. With surprise, less numbers are needed. The trick would be to make whatever happen in this Plan B actually work, with full knowledge that most of the time “Plan B” fails at the last possible moment, like in Germany in 2007. The main reason for Plan B failing is lack of having a plan that makes people complicit and so it lacks enough numbers – so that a small group striking by itself of course looses its backbone. What would be needed is a Plan B that happened at the same time as the majority of people were on the streets, and could join in organically.

What do these alternatives leave the RNC Welcoming Committee and Unconventional Action? First of all, they are complementary to the official “three-tier” blockading strategy. All the proposed alternatives also need all the concrete resources, from housing to large meetings, provided by the RNC Welcoming Committee. Already, it is far too late to convince everyone to abandon the “three-tier” blockading strategy, and no doubt there will be people attempting to go ahead with it. The alternatives from a Black Bloc to closed groupings could then strike at the same time and in the same general location as the official “three-tier strategy” could take advantage of the chaos caused by whatever groups are involved in the “three-tier strategy” distracting the police and being arrested. Groups involved in the “three-tier strategy” could also not go to any announced locations and so into the waiting arms of the police, but be prepared to move in a chaotic, swarm-like fashion over the entire zone of conflict, making themselves less predictable and likely to be arrested. Lastly, all these groups could come prepared not just for vaguely “blockading,” but for the necessity of self-defense against the violence of the police. Remember that a vague plan one cannot easily visualize happening is not going to happen. And there should always be even more secret plans, not just a single “Plan B” but one, two, a thousand. Betting everything on one day of action may not be the best of ideas. Any plan should have enough angles so that if one component fails, another component may still succeed. If these are components are well-known and spread, depending on the level of security needed, through word of mouth and public announcement, it seems like real victory might be possible. Never accept the verdict of the “organizers” for any strategic plan – always think for yourself. And as for the day of action - the combination of groups with secret plans, public blockades that are more chaotic than the police are ready for, and a large Black Bloc could be a perfect storm to defeat the Republicans, much more so than the “three-tier” blockading plan by itself.

Why Anarchists Need Strategy

“Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.” Karl von Clausewitz

The difference between tactics and strategy is subtle but magnified in times when history itself is open for the taking. Tactics are means, made concrete by the use of actions to accomplish victory at a particular engagement in a war. For example, if one wishes to stop a car, one could sit down in front of it, or puncture its tires. To break a window requires rocks or boots. One could cause “disruption” by sitting in the streets or throwing a rock at a cop. These are tactical, not strategic, choices and a diversity of tactics means to agree that different tactics can be used at the same time. Nothing more, nothing less, from the Black Bloc to nonviolent blockades. Strategy is the use of engagements in the pursuit of ends, and the ends of war are victory. Why should one break a window or stop a car in the first place? How does this gain you any advantage? The “Three-Tier Strategy” is not a strategy, but a tactical framework for a particular engagement, the RNC 2008. It just fails as a strategy. It assumes that the end is the blocking of delegates getting to the convention, and so the “Three Tier So-Called Strategy” actually limits tactics by assuming that everyone shares this goal of blocking delegates. One could argue that despite a lack of strategy, any action is better than no action. Yet is a defeat based on a flawed tactical framework better than nothing happening? That is nothing more than the logic of endless campaign-based activism and summit-hopping. A failure on the scope of Miami 2003 could actually kill off the resurgent anarchist activity in the United States, Some may be offended that we dare critique the “Three-Tier Strategy”? Is that not also the type of thinking of of liberals and leftists, who have never been able to talk to their friends honestly and constructively? It is great to put a plan forward early like Unconventional Action did, but only if it begins a conversation, not ends it prematurely.

What is lacking is a real strategy for anarchists in the United States and around the globe. After RNC 2008, what next? Anarchists in the United States has no answer. The ends of the strategy is not stopping the delegates of the RNC 2008, but the destruction of capitalism itself and the self-organization of new social relationships. We have no choice but to join this social war, as capitalism is engaged in total war against most of humanity and life on this planet. The real strategic question is whether or not the RNC 2008 is a useful engagement in this longer war against capital. We believe it is, but not just by repeating the same worn-out formulae of yesteryear like the blockading of the WTO Seattle protests in 1999. The world has moved on. It is time not just for tactical thinking, but strategic thinking by the anarchist movement in the United States.The discourse of the War on Terror is no longer even believed by large swathes of Americans, and the Republicans are hated by more and more as the embodiment of a dying order and a failed occupation. If the stage of history can be redefined not as America versus Al-Qaeda, but as anarchists against capital, then there has been victory regardless of whether or not any delegates are stopped. In this analysis, it does not matter if anarchist block a single delegate. What matters is that we win by committing new and dangerous actions that both raise our morale, build our collective strength instead of dissipating it, spread the knowledge that resistance is possible throughout the media, and increase the complicity of all those around us in our war against capital. A tactical framework that keeps these broader tactical goals in mind can then show how the RNC 2008 can play a part in a strategy for victory in the war against capital. There is always a Plan B. The goal is the complete destruction of the enemy’s potential, and such a victory can almost always be obtained.

By merely two individuals (with no anarcho-Trotskyist front groups, unlike some of the groups endorsing the “Three-tier strategy”!) involved in the last decade of summit mobilizations.

Via Infoshop

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